The narrative is enthralling. Britain is drawn reluctantly into a risky venture determined by its closest ally.

Warnings about the political cost, the dubious legality and the lack of a long-term goal abound.

As he prepares to meet the US President for a council of war, the Prime Minister receives chilling words of caution from his Foreign Secretary. The weight of civil service, parliamentary and public opinion is against committing the country to America's plans. Yet can Britain afford to shatter the special relationship by standing aside?

I'm not blaming Blair for George's decisions: George's decisions are George's responsibilities (and our burdens). But Blair could have delivered a Patton slap: do it, and you go without us. It probably wouldn't have stopped George, but in a best possible scenario, it may have slowed the unholy rush to war, given Hans Blix time to conclude what David Kay found out a year and many lives later (there were no WMD), and thus exposed George's true reason: "F*** Saddam! We're taking him out!"

Equally reasonably, George & Co. could have gone off quarter-cocked (as opposed to half-cocked) a year earlier — but without the quasi legitimacy Blair engineered. But then we would be having a very different election campaign.

barbyawp.blogspot.com/ 2004_09_01_barbyawp_archive.html#109542631379759423

I'm going to get the quote wrong, but I thought the most compelling moment in Fahrenheit 9/11 was this:

"I'm constantly amazed that those who have the least are willing to give the most."

And I'm constantly amazed at how those that have the most are willing to sacrifice those who have the least.